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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a corporation, as Executor of
the ESTATE OF JAMES C. DEMIRIS, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
8982

IPHEGENIA P. DEMIRIS,
Defendant and Respondent,
MARGARETA DEMIRIS PAPACASTAS, CONSTANTINO C. DEMIRIS,
ATHANASIOS DEMIRIS, ·PETER
DEMIRIS and JOHN DEMIRIS,
Intervenors and Appellants.

l.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND
ANSWER BRIEF OF CROSS RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In view of the complex and difficult nature of this case,
appellants feel obliged to call the court's attention to a few
of the numerous instances of inexact reporting by respondent
of the testimony of some of the witnesses, notwithstanding the
3
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existence of the typewritten record in this court.
The .,record,
.
we submit, when compared with respondent's purported summation of the facts calls to mind Mark Twain's admonition
that the "difference between the right word and .the word that
will do is the difference between the lightning and the lightning
bug."
For simplification in this brief,· we will also refer to the
transcript under the record page number thereof as used· by
the respondent rather than the transcript page number that
we used in our first brief. All italics and other emphasis herein
are ours.
Respondent's Brief, page 23: "It may be just coincidence that John would see his brother down town
every day in November and would note an unusual
circumstance in connection with his memory on November 26th, the day he found out about Jim's will."
Actual Testimony: There is no evidence justifying
the conclusion that John Demiris knew that he was
named in the will on November 26th or at any other
time prior to probate. However, it is difficult to see
wherein a sinister motive may be ascribed to John's
wanting his brother to see a doctor on that date even
if he did have such knowledge.
Respondent's Brief, page 12: "For two months before Jim went to the hospital she had a chance to see
him and talked to him many times since he lived in
the apartment next door (R. 381), and they talked
in Greek all of the time."
·
Actual Testimony: Mrs. Demas did not observe Jim
for two months, for it was stipulated that she did not
move into the apartment until November 12 (R. 393,
394) only five weeks prior to Jim's hospitalization.
4
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Respondent's Brief, page 17: "The doctor (Dr.
Powell) could not remember any specific history given
to him by the wife. . . . "
Actual Testimony: The history was given by John
and Mrs. Demiris, both of them present and supplying
portions; the doctor could not remember which specific
information was given by which person. However, it
is clear that there was no disagreement between them
as to when the illness began or how it progressed. "It
was taken in their joint presence . . . by myself asking
questions . . . and everyone present, except the patient,
supplied some information, and the sum of that information was noted by me . . . " (R. 130) .
Respondent's Brief, pages 18 and 19: If Dr. Powell
had had any knowledge of the observations of lay
witnesses, such observations "would certainly alter his
opinion."
Actual Testimony: "All facts ... would have been
taken into consideration, of course, and depending
on how I felt about those facts . . . I would certainly
have considered them and they might alter my opinion.'' (R. 149).
Respondent's Brief, page 19 (26, 27): "Dr. Powell
acknowledged that the best evidence concerning the
competency of Mr. Demiris would lie in observations
of his mental and physical activities by others in a
period in which the deterioration occurred; and this
does not necessarily require medical observation but
could be observation by those living with him or associating with him and those with whom he did business."
Actual Testimony: None of the respondent's witnesses qualified in such close association except Mrs.
Demiris who contributed the history which included
the report of serious illness for. at least three weeks
prior to December 18. Both Mrs. Demiris and John

5
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Demiris were closely questioned by Dr. Powell in taking the history for purposes of treatment. In relation
to reliance upon lay witnesses, Dr. Powell stated that
he would have to interrogate them: "I would want
to know the details of their observations, and I would
prefer to question the witnesses as I did the family
in taking the history. In other words, I wouldn't
simply take what they said unqualifiedly." (R. 156).
Respondent's Brief, page 26: The statement that Dr.
Howard found Mr. Demiris rational, implying competent, on December 1st, is misleading.
Actual Testimony: It is clear that Dr. Howard meant
only that Mr. Demiris was not indulging in grossly
abnormal behavior. He further stated that Mr. Demiris
"did not appear to me to answer or comprehend questions that were given to him." (R. 165, 166).
Respondent's Brief, page 26: Dr. Powell could only
''speculate" as to Jim's condition prior to December
18th.
Actual Testimony: Dr. Powell actually testified "I
feel that I could ... express a reasonably certain medical opinion." (R. 150).
Respondent's Brief, page 26: The respondent asserts
that the doctor noted the entire condition of senile
deterioration could have occurred within a few days.
Actual Testimony: In fact, the doctor, under crossexamination, stated that it was possible (i.e. it was
not impossible (R. 155) that the condition could have
occurred within a few days. But this does not detract
from his considered medical opinion based not only
upon his observations but also upon the history he
obtained, that Mr. Demiris was not competent on
December 5th.
Respondent's Brief, page 27: Respondent states: "Dr.
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Powell while indicating that there could have been
symptoms of deterioration existing from one to four
months prior to December 18,1956, admitted that it
is entirely possible that the deterioration could be very
rapid."
Actual Testimony: Dr. Powell stated clearly and unequivocally, "I think it is improbable and medically
quite unlikely that the patient had been competent
within a period of one to four months prior to the time
I saw him." (R. 150). He at no time stated that it
was entirely possible that the deterioration could be
very rapid, but merely acknowledged that this type of
condition could have occurred within a few days. ·
Respondent's Brief, page 28: Respondent claims that
Dr. Callaghan found Jim very responsive.
Actual Testimony: Dr. Callaghan, an eye, ear, nose
and throat specialist, merely noted nothing unusual
in Jim's behavior (R. 279). He admitted that he had
never seen Jim prior to this visit.
Respondent's Brief, page 73: In her cross appeal
respondent states: "Where Mr. Demiris said if he
shoudl get sick or something, he wanted his wife to
have the money, it would seem to be an undue limitation to say that under the circumstances he only intended
for her to get the money so long as he was sick, but
not if he passed away."
Actual Testimony: Floyd Long, trust officer at the
bank, testified that Mr. Demiris actually said, "He
said he would like her to be able to cash the check, in
case he was sick or something she could cash it and have
some money." There was no other testimony that Mr.
Demiris wanted' his wife to have the money.
Respondent's Brief, pages 37, 38: "Jim must have
become suspicious of Peter and John after November
7
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26 because he refused to talk with Peter and John
thereafter."
Actual Testimony: There is no evidence that Jim
refused to talk with Peter and John. The evidence
showed that he was withdrawn and uncommunicative
during this period.
Responden-ts Brief, page 38: "Mr. Demiris, while
he and defendant were visiting Mrs. Tsimpoukis on
December 7th, 1956 told Mrs. Tsimpoukis that he went
to the bank and changed the books."
Actual T estimonys Mrs. Tsimpoukis said "One of
them said he went to the bank and changed the books"
but she wasn't sure whether it was Jim Demiris or the
defendant." (R. 358, 367). If such was actually said,
the testimony indicates it was the respondent rather
than her husband.

POINTS I and II
All of the evidence respecting the condition, conduct
and acvtivities of James C. Demiris is consistent with the
testimony of Dr. Chester Powell, who attended Mr. Demiris
in his last illness and who stated that in his opinion, based
upon reasonable medical certainty, the deceased, Jim Demiris,
had been incompetent to transact his business at the time he
purportedly gave possession of his estate to the respondent,
his wife. The testimony of the appellants' witnesses that Jim
Demiris seemed changed, nervous, dull, withdrawn, with failing memory, etc., from September on substantiate the doctor's
diagnosis completely, and the testimony of respondent's witnesses is not incompatible with such diagnosis and the symptoms
of the illness as described by Dr. Powell.
8
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The doctor testified that the onslaught of the illness
would make the patient wary of personal contacts and that he
would compensate for his diminishing mental powers by automatic responses, silence, and by avoiding social contacts. He
testified that "semi-strangers or mere acquaintances .meeting
on the street might notice nothing. Relatives or people who
had known the individual for sometime, particular!y if they
spent any time with him, might or might not notice something
in the earlier phases" (R. 139). It thus seems scarcely necessary
to reiterate the lack of opportunity for reliable observation
on the part of some of the respondent's witnesses such as the
insurance salesman who greeted the couple on the street or
Mr. Long, who talked briefly with Mr. Demiris in English,
while Mrs. Demiris gave her husband instructions in Greek.
It is obvious too that there was little diagnostic significance in
Mrs. O'Connell's assertion that Mr. Demiris always recognized
her, while admitting that he appeared to be sick and just
seemed to give up a couple or three weeks before he went
to the hospital on December 21, 1956.
Mrs. Tsimpoukis was a close friend of Mrs. Demiris,
who believed Mrs. Demiris deserved the money and so testified;
her three visits with the deceased during this period,· although
of a slightly longer duration than the contact of the respondent's other witnesses, scarcely qualify as "close association,"
which Dr. Powell testified as essential to adequate and accurate
observation (R. 156). The fact that Jim Demiris could recognize someone and appear to converse normally with them even
though legally incompetent is clearly borne out by Mrs.
Tsimpoukis' testimony that when she visited Jim on December
19 or 20 he recognized her, conversed with her and didn't
9
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seem different, except that he was seeing people outside his
window when there weren't any people there (R. 368-369).
This visit was after Dr. Powell's extensive examination of
the deceased, Jim Demiris, on December 18th when Dr. Powell
found him "incompetent for all ordinary activities of life,"
(R. 145) and "unable ... to exercise any degree of judgment"
(R. 146).
The obvious lack of time and ability to assess the deceased's mental condition is true also of Mrs. Bombas, who
spoke mostly to Mrs. Demiris during her visits with them,
and the same is true of Mrs. Tiano. Jim Demiris was only one
of some 25 or so patients that Dr. Callaghan saw on November
28, 1956. The doctor was only treating him for an eye condition and was seeing him for the first time. It is submitted
that Jim Demiris' responses to the doctor's questions would
be of an automatic type and thus the doctor probably would
observe nothing apparently abnormal.
Dr. Diumenti admitted on cross-examination that Jim
Demiris did not respond to all of his questions, refuting his
earlier testimony that he appeared responsive. He was suffi·
ciently concerned about Jim's condition to immediately refer
him to a specialist and give a history used by the specialist
in his treatment (R. 131 Ex. D-9). Even under the careful
scrutiny of this medical specialist, .Mr. Demiris characteristically
concealed his difficulties of mental coordinf1;tion, for Dr.
Powell wrote to Dr. Diumenti on December 20, 1956: "On
examination Mr. Demiris shows the slow cerebration and
ready confusion of a senile person, although his speech and
initial responsese would seem appropriate enough" (Ex. D-9).
10
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It is submitted that the defendant herself was the best
witness as to the progress of her husband's disease. While at
the trial she recalled nothing had been wrong with her husband
except for difficulties with his eyes and legs prior to his
treatment by Dr. Powell on December 18th, (R. 81) her
statements to both Dr. Powell on December 18th and Dr. Phil
Howard on December 1st are in direct contradiction to this
testimony. She told Dr. Howard about her husband's confusion, forgetfulness and wanderings prior to December 1st
(R. 164). On December 18th she was in a highly emotional
state because of her concern about ·her husband's condition,
and at that time emphatically described the symptoms that
her husband had evidenced over a period of months, and told
the doctor that he had "gotten bad three weeks before" (T.
130, 151) . These statements made by her prior to litigation,
when she was concerned about Jim's health, are highly credible
and substantiate completely the statement by Dr. Powell as
to her husband's incompetency on December 18th, and that
such incompetency had occurred some one to four months
before (R. 150).
The defendant's actions in hurriedly withdrawing all of
the cash in the bank accounts and cashing in 69 U. S. Savings
Bonds of a value of $9,700.00 (Ex. P-22) immediately after
her husband was hospitalized in an incompetent state, together
with her questioning of Frank Vleck and Alke Diamant about
Jim's bank accounts (R. 121, 221-222) and then denying
doing so (R. 104), are highly suspicious circumstances, indicative of bad faith and over-reaching. The substantial
evidence of independent witnesses who testified that Jim
Demiris on numerous occasions represented that he desired
11
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his brothers and sisters to share in his estate, together with the
facts that his life with his wife was very unhappy and whenever he had independent advice regarding his affairs he included
his relaitves in the disposition of his estate, establishes by
compelling evidence that his wife exerted pressure and undue
influence upon him in obtaining control of substantially all
of his assets.
Upon a review of the evidence of incompetency and undue
influence, this court should conclude that the trial court was
in. error in finding against appellants on both of these issues,
thereby requiring a reversal of these findings. Such a reversal
on either ground would recover the following bank accounts
to the executor and enable the assets contained therein to be
used to satisfy the deceased's bequests made in his Last Will
and Testament:
Ex
Ex
Ex
Ex

P-17
P-13
P-14
P-16

American Savings & Loar't
Continental Bank & Trust Co.
State Savings & Loan
American Savings & Loan

$10,175.00
10,125.00
8,104.45
10,000.00

POINTS III AND IV
Appellants find it extremely difficult to reply to the
respondent's answer to appellant's points III and IV, since
respondent in her answer has merely repeated appellants'
authorities, while ignoring or misreading appellants' position
and reasoning in support thereof. It is appellants' position
and reasoning that the conclusive presumption of Holt v.
Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 Pac 2d 715, should be overruled, for
the court in deciding this case went astray by following cases
12
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decided in states havin~ a statute c,reating a conclusive presumption and providing a form which will evoke this presumption. The Holt case, as poirted out by Justice Wade in
Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah, 571, 212 Pac 2d 194, is irreconcilable with the other Utah cases on bank accounts. It is
respectfully submitted that in overruling the Holt case this
courf would fall in line with the general rule that in the
absence of a statutory provision establishing the rights of
depositors between themselves, it is generally held that evidence
presented as to the ownership of the fund must be considered
in the light of common law principles under circumstances
attending the deposit. (See Appellants' Brief, page 48 et seq.)
If this court sees fit to overrule the Holt v. Bayles case, appellants woud then be entitled at least to a new trial for the
purpose of obviating the trial court's error in its application
of a conclusive presumption as to the donative intent of James
Demiris to all of the money in the joint bank accounts and
the United States Government bonds. It would seem that the
question of whether a new trial should be granted or the trial
court's finding on the issues of donative intent reversed without
the granting of a new trial, would depend upon the court's
resolution of the burden of proof question raised by Justice
Wade in Greener v. Greener, supra. Justice Wade in his
special concurrence pointed out that the Greener case and
the Holt case create a confusion of burdens of proof, with
each side requiring clear and convincing evidence, since the
monies in the bank account could only pass by virtue of a gift
if th.ere is no consideration in the agreement of deposit. The
clear and convincing proof required in all other gift situations
is completly destroyed where the counterconclusive presumption
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of the Holt case is applied (Appellants' Brief pages 46, 47;
discussed, pages 51, 52.)
If the burden of persuasion ultimately rests on the alleged
donee, the defendant and respondent in this case, as it does in
all other gift situations, or if the burden of going forward
devolved upon the donee after presentation of evidence contrary to the intent expressed in the bank deposit cards, then
the finding on the issue of donat.ive intent should be reversed,
without the granting of a new trial, for the respondent Mrs.
Demiris did not present evidence of a gift sufficient to permit
a finding of donative intent. This court should then reverse
the finding of the trial court and order judgment entered for
appellant executor on the following bank accounts and bonds:

Ex
Ex
Ex
Ex
Ex
Ex
Ex
Ex

First Security Bank
Continental Bank
P-13 Continental Bank
P-14 State Savings & Loan
P-15 State Savings & Loan
P-16 American Savings & Loan
P-17 American Savings & Loan
P-22 U. S. Government Bonds
P-10

$ 6,841.99

P-12

10,125.00
10,125.00
8,104.45
10,000.00
10,000.00
10,175.00
9,700.00

There should be no question that all of the bonds should be
given the executor for there is no bank account language here
for the respondent to rely upon. While Ex. P-22 indicates the
bonds were "Series E" payable to "Mr. James Demiris or Mrs.
Iphegenia Demeris,'' there was no such bond introduced or
any evidence of the language thereof. All respondent presented
concerning the bonds was that she was in Greece when Jim
bought them; he wrote her that he was putting her name on

14
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them; and that she cashed them while Jim was in the hospital
(R. 105). Respondent did not prove a gift as to the U. S.
bonds.

If on the other hand this court should hold that the
burden lies with appellants under any circumstances, appellants submit that they have sufficiently met that burden and
are entitled to judgment as to all of the money in all of the
accounts. The evidence outlined by the appellants under Point
IV of their brief is substantial and compelling and should
require the finding that no gift was intended to be made in any
of these accounts by James Demiris to the respondent. If
this court is reluctant to find, in view of the finding of the
trial court, that the appellants' burden was met, then a new
trial should be ordered as to the portions of the judgment
upon which appellants did not prevail, involving the Government bonds and the bank accounts enumerated in the preceding
paragraph. This would be required if Holt v. Bayles is overruled, because the appellants were hampered in making their
proof in the eyes of the trial court by its erroneous application
of a conclusive presumption in favor of the respondent as
joint owner of the bank accounts.
The respondent in her brief has sought to evade the very
difficult problem of burden of proof in a gift situation by
stating that "the problem is not confined to a question of gift,
but involves a question of whether there was an intention to
create a survivorship or joint tenancy relationship" (Respondent's Brief, pages 53 and 54). The fallacy of this reasoning
is pointed out in the quotations from L.R.A. and Am. Jur. on
page 49 of appellant's brief. Furthermore, by respondent's
assertions and admissions in her brief on page 4, she makes
I)
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no claim to any of the money that she acquired from the bank
accounts except through purported "gifts in contemplation
of death." Furthermore such contention is not applicable to
the Government Bonds where there is only apparent co-ownership by being payable to A or B, which according to Greener
v. Greener, supra, does not establish survivorship or joint
ownership.

POINTV
Under Point V the respondent confuses the issue by intimating that the Continental Bank cards contain words granting a survivorship interest (Respondent's brief, page 57).
This is not true, and an inspection of these cards which were
introduced into evidence by the court will show that there is
mere!y a provision that the bank may pay to the survivor (See
Ex. P-12 and P-13). While it is true that a joint tenancy may
be created by the use of such words as "joint tenancy," "with
rights of survivorship," or without them, as provided by statute
and the cases cited by respondent at pages 57, 58 and 59 of
her brief, there must, however, be some demonstration that
an interest shall pass. Respondent overlooks the fact that the
bank account cards are merely evidence of the gift. In Colorado Trust Company v. Anglum, 63 Utah 354, 225 Pac. 1089,
evidence extrinsic with the card showing a joint ownership
of funds; that the husband and wife jointly contributed and
jointly owned the funds; and therefore it was found that
rights of survivorship follow the agreement of the parties.
Contrast this situation with the present case where respondent
relies solely upon the presumption created by the joint deposit
16
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card, the language of which demonstrates no intention to give
or agreement by the parties to hold jointly. Also cited by
respondent as favoring presumption on these two cards in
her favor is Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 Pac 2d, 327,
but involved in that case was a card which clearly stated that
the funds were to be held jointly. The present case falls within
the exception of Greener v. Greener. There is no difference in
significance between "Pay A or B" and "Pay A or B or survivor."
Respondent mttmates further that the appellants have
waived their rights to rely upon the language of the Continental
Bank cards by not stressing it during the pretrial and the
trial. The respondent is of course in error, because by this
assertion she is attempting to shift the burden of proof regarding these gifts which she claims on to the appellants. Without
the cards she has no claim to the money deposited under them.
Upon introducing the cards she can claim only the gift of
interest which the cards divulge. It is her burden, not the
appellants', to produce valid, clear and convincing evidence
of gift, whether by the bank deposit cards or otherwise. This
she failed to do. Greener v. Greener held "If there is no
agreement between the parties which has been reduced to
writing, the only documentary evidence being the form of the
deposit (e.g. 'in account with A or B' with no provision concerning survivorship), the intent of the owner in converting
the account to a joint one must be shown by extrinsic evidence
as there is no presumption that a 'joint tenancy' or gift was
intended."
The authorization to the bank contained m the cards
17
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permitted them to pay to "either of us or to the survivor of
us," and that such payment will be a full acquittance and discharge of the bank, does nothing more than the language of
the deposit in the Greener cards, "in account with A or B,"
which again would authorize the bank to pay to either A or
B with impugnity, and thus the funds in the two Continental
Bank deposits, amounting to $20,250.00, should go to the
estate of the deceased to perform his wishes expressed in his
last will and testament.

POINT VI
It is curious to note that respondent attempts to rely upon

the elements of joint tenancy common to real estate transactions in arguing Point V, but in Point VI ignores the question of unities necessary to the creation of a joint tenancy, and
scoffs at the New Jersey-Pennsylvania rule as to the effects
of severance by the withdrawal by one of the depositors. The
rule of Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 130 N.J. Eq. 176, 21 Atl. 2d
743, that the wife's withdrawal of all moneys in the accounts
while the husband was alive and insane, destroyed the joint
tenancy, and that she then became a tenant in common of
the funds to the extent of her presumed one-half interest,
holding the other half share as agent or trustee for her husband,
we submit is based upon sound legal rationale. Clearly the
withdrawal destroyed the unities of ownership, interest, and
title, and thus severed and extinguished the joint estate. The
adoption by this court of the Steinmetz rule would permit
recov~ry by the appellant executor of one-half of the money
contained in the following accounts:
18
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Ex
Ex
Ex
Ex
Ex
Ex
Ex

P-17
P-13
P-14
P-15
P-10
P-12
P-22

$10,175.00
10,125.00
8,104.45
10,000.00
6,841.99
10,125.00
9,700.00

Appellants do not quarrel with the respondent's interpretation of Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 167 U.E.
506, A.L.R. 871, but wish to point out that in that case the
New York court held that even where there was a conclusive
presumption created by statute of a joint tenancy, that such
presumption is not conclusive with respect to any moneys withdrawn prior to the death of one of the depositors. As the
appellants were met at the trial of this case with· the erroneous
conclusive presumption created by Holt v. Bayles, supra, the
trial court did not consider the evidence in their favor as is
permitted even where, as in New York, a conclusive presumption is a part of the state's statutory law. Thus, even if the court
should not adopt the rule of Steinmetz, which we submit
is a sound case on all four's with the case before this court,
but rather adopts the conclusions of the New York court,
the appellants would still be entitled to a new trial as to those
portions of the judgment in the respondent's favor because
of the effect of Holt v. Bayles, supra.
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ANSWER TO CROSS APPEAL
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS FINDING
THAT THE TRUST ACCOUNT AT AMERICAN SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION IN THE NAME OF JAMES
DEMIRIS, TRUSTEE FOR IPHEGENIA DEMIRIS FOR
$10,000.00 FAILED FOR WANT OF DONATIVE INTENT
AND FAILED TO CREATE A TENANCY IN COMMON.

It is fundamental Hornbook law that no gift in a bank
account of either the legal or equitable title can be made withnqt donative intent.
'' . . . the intention of the depositor controls in determining whether or not a trust has been created . . .
No trust is created in the absence of such intention
or if the intention is not given effect. Usually, in deciding as to the existence of a trust, including the intention
of the depositor, the surrounding facts and circumstances are considered in connection with the acts and
declarations of the depositor, and the question is determined as one of fact and not of law." 89 C.J.S.,
Trusts, Sec. 54; Buteau v. Lavalle, 284 Mass. 276,
187 N.E. 628.
" . . . while the fact that the deposit is in form in
trust for one other than the depositor is some proof
of intention and entitled to consideration, or raises a
presumption of an intention to create a trust, and
may control in the absence of countervailing circumstances : . . the fact that the depositor is designated
as trustee for another is not necessarily controlling or
conclusive and will not prevail where there is an absence of an intention to create a trust, as shown by the
declartaion of the depositor and the surrounding cir20
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cumstances." 89 C.J.S., Trusts, Section 54; Wasserman
v. C.I.R., 139 F.2d 778; Hogarth-Swann vs. Steele,
294 Mass. 396, 2 N.E. 2d 446; Robertson v. Parker,
287 Mass. 351, 191 N.E. 645; Boyer v. Backus, 282
Mich. 593, 276 N.W. 564; Haux v. Dry Dock Savings
Inst., 37 N.Y.S. 917, 2 App. Div. 165, aff'd 49 N.E.
1097; A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Sections 2~ and 24.
In Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 478, 286
Pacific 638, at Page 643, this Court said:
" . . . the donor must intend that either the legal or
equitable title to the fund shall pass to the donee. The
intention must be that some title to the account shall
pass during the life of the donor otherwise the gift
must fail unless the requirements of the law as to
testamentary dispositions of property have been complied with.''
Although the trial court found that this account was a revocable trust, it is apparent that this was a mere designation
of the account following the language of the instrument itself,
for the court further found no donative intent and decreed that
this account should belong to the estate of the deceased. The
finding was clearly supported by "the evidence as below outlined.
A. Only the front side of the trust account card was
signed by James Demiris (Exhibit P-16). This signed portion
respondent admits merely recited that the account was in the
name of James Demiris, trustee for Iphegenia Demiris. The
terms of the trust or the so-called trust agreement are found
on the reverse side of the card with another signature line
at the end thereof for the grantor to sign upon. This trust
21
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agreement was n,ever signed by James Demiris, the grantor.
Therefore, as there was no additional evidence in the record
with respect to this trust account, no trust can be said to have
been created. This is much the same situation as was found
in Woods v. Woods, 87 Utah 394, 49 Pacific (2d) 416, where
this Court at Page 419 said:
"The Courts have generally held that a savings
account in the name of a third party by the depositor'};
as trustee or in the name of the depositor, as trustee for ·
a third party is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish a trust and is insufficient to constitute a gift during
the life time of the depositor.
"It thus seems that the form of the act standing
alone, by the great weight of authority, is not sufficient
to show an intention to create a trust or prove a gift
of the money. Other corrobative evidence is essential."
It is to be noted that this rule is also applicable to the
"Totten Trust" cases relied upon by the respondent in her
brief for these cases all recite the trust terms that were clearly
provided for in connection with the trust account upon which
the Courts relied to establish the intent of the donor in creating the trust. There are no such provisions jn this case nor
other corroborative evidence that can be relied upon to establish intent.

B. It is obvious from the form of the account card that
in order to incorporate the terms of the trust agreement printed
on the back, it would be necessary for the grantor to sign on
the line provided for his signature under the said trust agreement. However, if such trust terms shoudl be considered in·
corporated by reference as respondent apparently contends,
22
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:he result woudl be one which neither Mr. Demiris nor Mrs.
Demiris intended. It is provided in the trust agreement
"if the age of the beneficiary is not specified (and
it was not specified) this trust is f_pr the life of said
beneficiary and six months . . . (and) "the funds in
said trust account shall be the property of the estate
of said beneficiary."

Respondent's brief confesses that the major concern of the
deceased in making his wills and in refusing to go back to
Greece was the fear that Mrs. Demiris' family (who would
inherit from her estate) would poison him for his money.
C. The money of this account was necessary to perform
the bequests of his will. Since a Totten trust may be revoked
by provisions of a will, A.L.I. Restatement of Trusts, Section
58, Comment b., the previous settlement of his estate by will
would appear to have some bearing on his intention to again
dispose of the same money.

D. The evidence of the relationship of the parties, the
time of the change in the names on deposit, the numerous
expressions of intent by the deceased to provide for his sisters
and brothers cited at length by appellants in their first brief,
support the finding of the trial court that Mr. Demiris did not
intend to give, by trust, or otherwise, the money in this account
to his wife.
E. Respondent as the donee had the burden of proving
the gift of this allege4 trust account by clear and convincing
evidence. Wood v. Wood, supra; Christensen v. Ogden State
Bank, 75 Utah 478, 286 P. 638. The presumptions provided
by the Courts in the joint account cases such as Holt v. Bayles,
23
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supra, Greener v. Greener, supra, and Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah
181, 120 Pacific (2d) 327, which shift the burden from the
donee would not apply to this trust account which was created
by a card signed only by James Demiris, the donor. These
joint account cases hold the presumption arises that a joint
tenancy was intended because both parties sign a joint account
card purporting to establish rights between them, and thereby
enter into a contract which is binding on the Court. Such
reasoning is obviously not applicable to a card signed by
only the donor. A review of the evidence shows the respondent
completely failed to meet her burden of proving a gift to her of
this trust account.
F. This Court has never, so far as we can determine, passed
directly upon the tentative trusts of savings bank deposits which
are frequently called "Totten Trusts." In Volume I, Scott on
Trusts, Section 58.3, the author on Page 484 reports that while
the New York Courts, which initiated this doctrine, speak as
though no trust arises until the death of the depositor, what
is really meant is that a trust is created at the time of the
deposit which is revocable in whole or in part by the depositor,
being this,
"subject to a condition subsequent of revocation
rather than to a condition precedent of the death of
the depositor. Even so, in view of the extent of the
control of the depositor over the deposit, the trust, in
substance, appears to be testamentary. It is clear that
a similar trust of property other than savings bank
deposits would be invalid.''
Scott indicates that because this is a convenient method of
disposing of comparatively small sums of money there seems
24
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T

to be no strong public policy to invalidate these trusts. Whert>,
as in this case, the sum involved is not small, and there was
a will which disposed of a substantial estate it would seem
that the Court should be slow in embracing this principle and
then only where all of the requirements are. clearly met. Boyle
v. Dinsdale, 45 Utah 112, 153 P. 136, was the only Utah case
relied upon by the respondent. This case does not support
the Totten Trust principle at all. It involved a present gift
in trust with enjoyment postponed until the death of the
donor rather than a revocable trust and the Court indicated that
if the gift in trust had been testamentary, it would have been
struck down. Thus, it appears to be an expression of this
Court contrary to the principle of the Totten cases.
Assuming, however, for the sake of argument that the
Totten doctrine applies in Utah, as claimed by respondent,
the rule in re Totten, 179 New York, 112, 71 N.E. 748, is:
"In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary
without revocation or some decisive act or declaration
of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at
the death of the depositor."
The doctrine has no application to the instant case. The tria]
court held that any presumption was overcome by evidence
showing that no trust was intended. The function of the
Totten doctrine is to put the donor's intention into effect even
though in substance this is a testamentary disposition contrary
to law because of the donor's retention of control during his
lifetime. Here the trial court found the donor had no intention
to give an interest. For all of the foregoing reasons the action
25
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of the trial court in awarding this trust account to the executor
should be affirmed.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE DEFENDANT, THEREBY AWARDING THE BALANCE DUE JAMES DEMIRIS
ON THE ELMER BUTLER NOTE AND MORTGAGE TO
THE EXECUTOR.
Appellants respectfully submit that the counterclaim of
the defendant and respondent in this matter was without
merit, and in support of this position direct the court's attention
to three instruments, their inter-relation and the law applicable
thereto. These instruments are:
(A) The promissory note of Elmer Butler and Minerva
Anne Butler in the sum of $54,300.00, executed November
28, 2949, payable to James Demiris, pursuant to the terms
and conditions thereof, with payments to be made at the First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., Exchange Place Branch, Salt
Lake City, Utah, (referred to in Ex. P-1).

(B) The letter of December 23, 1949 addressed to First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., signed by James Demiris. Among ,I
other provisions, James Demiris instructed First Security Bank j
of Utah, N.A. "to collect from Elmer Butler and Minerva
Anne Butler payments due or to become due under the
[November 28, 1949) note and mortgage and to divide the
moneys so received once a month * * * * "pursuant to a
formula spelled out in the instrument. James Demiris agreed
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to pay to First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., the sum of
$3.00 per month for its services in collecting and paying. This
letter of instructions provides: 11 ft is further understood and
agreed that the undersigned may, at his option, revoke this
agreement at any time he so desires, providing that the undersigned has paid to First Security Bank of Utah the amounts
due them for their services hereunder." This instrument and
offer was accepted the 27th day of December, 1949, by First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. (Exhibit P-1).
(C) The December 10 ,1956 letter directed to the First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A.: "Gentlemen: With respect to
the account you are collecting from Mr. Elmer Butler, we the
undersigned, hereby express our desire to have the portion
heretofore sent to Mr. James Demiris made out to the below
named individuals: James Demiris or Iphegenia Demiris." This
instrument (Exhibit D-20) was signed by James and Iphegenia
Demiris.
The position of appellants in this matter is that this
letter of December 10, 1956, has no legal significance whatsoever, or viewed in the light most favorable to defendants,
is a letter of instructions from a principal to his agent, and
all power thereunder terminated on the death of the principal.
In support of such conclusion, we reason as follows:
1. The instruction of 10 December 1956 at most denotes

. or creates a relationship between the First Security Bank and
:James Demiris. It is not a contract between the signers, nor
, does it indicate a relationship as between them. Its effect
, runs between the bank and James Demir is, since it bears
·.upon the relationship already existing between those parties.
27
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2. The instrument of 10 December 1956 uses the word
"desire," which is precatory in nature and has no legal significance; it conveys no estate. According to the general rule,
"desire" has no legal effect except in the case of wills, where
extrinsic evidence may show a legal obligation. See also Desire,
26 A. CJS Desire, p. 866; Words and Phrases, Desire.
3. The instrument of December 23, 1949 is in the form
of a letter of instructions and offer by James Demiris, with
an acceptance by the offeree as such instrument is nothing
more or less than a contract for the performance of certain
services by the First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., and the
promise on the part of James Demiris to pay a stated consideration for said services. By the very terms of the contract
it was revokable at the will of James Demiris. This instru~
ment cannot be construed as being a conveyance of any estate.
The communication of December 10, 1956, directed to the
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., can only be read in relation
to the contract of 27 December 1949, and by implication it
refers to the latter. As such it constitutes a modification or
amendment of the original letter of instruction.
By the very terms of the December 27, 1949 agreement
(Exhibit P-1) the contract of services could be revoked at
will. The letter of instruction of December 10, 1956, would,
of course, be subject to the same power to terminate.
It is a well-established rule that the death of the principal
terminates and revokes the authority of an agent by operation
of law. 2 C.J.S., Agency, Sec. 86, page 1174. This rule applies
even though the agency is in its terms irrevocable. (Ibid.)
According to 2 Am. Jur. Agency, Section 59, p. 52:
28
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"It is well established as the general rule that the
death of the principal operates as an ins,tantaneous
and absolute revocation of the agent's authority or
power, unless the agency is one coupled with an interest. Hence, any act done by the agent, as such, after
the principal's death will not affect the estate of the
latter.''
(See Halloran Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258

P. 342, 64 ALR 368.)
"In order that a power may be irrevocable because coupled
with an interest, it is necessary that the interest shall be in the
subject matter of the power, and not in the proceeds which
will arise from the exercise of the power." 2 Am. Jur., Agency,
p. 62; Halloran Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, supra.
As a matter of law the counterclaim was properly dismissed with prejudcie, and judgment awarded plaintiff. The
instrument of 10 December 1956 is a letter expressing a
"wish" of a principal to his agent, or considered most favorable
to defendant, nothing more than a direction of a principal to
his agent, and its legal effect terminated by the death of the
principal.
The 10 December 1956 instrument is not an assignment.
It is a general rule of law that the assignor must not retain
any control over the fund or interest assigned, any power to
collect, or any power of revocation. In the case of Purman' s
Estate, 56 A. 2d 86, 175 A.L.R. 1129, "Assignment" is defined as follows:

" * * * a legal assignment is 'a transfer or setting
over of property, or of some right or interest therein,
from one person to another, and unless in some way
29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

qualified, it is properly the transfer of one whole interest in an estate, chattel, or other thing'

*

*

*

*

"On the other hand, an equitable assignment is
'Any order, writing, or act by the assignor which makes
an absolute appropriation of a chose in action or fund
to the use of the assignee with the intention to transfer
a present interest, although not amounting to a legal
assignment ... ' See * CJS, Assignments, § 58. In such
a situation, the assignor must not retain any control
over the fund, any authority to collection, or any power
of revocation. 4 Am Jur 288, Section 76."
In the case at bar there is no loss of control or transfer
of an interest. Whatever "authority" is granted First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A., it is to make checks payable in the disjunctive to James Demiris or Iphegenia Demiris. There is no
relinquishment of a power to collect or retention of control
of the chose in question by the original payee of the note.
James Demiris not only retained power to "revoke" instructions to the Bank, he had the control of the funds since the
method of making the checks evidencing collection of payments
under the note and mortgage was the only change, there
being no instrument conveying an interest from James Demiris
to Iphegenia Demiris. The 10 December 1956 letter runs
from the signing parties to the Bank; on its face it consti·
tutes no contract or agreement of assignment between the
signers. The instrument does not constitute a conveyance or
assignment by its very wording.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that a gift was
made or a contract formed between the Demiris'. Mrs. Demiris,
claiming a gift, has the burden of showing all the elements of

30
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that gift by clear and convmcmg evidence. The letter of
December 10, 1956, upon which she bases her claim, will .
not support even an inference of donative intent, much less
create a presumption. All the evidence introduced indicates that
no gift was intended. Mr. Long's testimony shows that Mr.
Demiris' intention was one of business convenience only, and
provided for the contingency that his illness would make him
unable to handle his affairs. The formal assignments that
James Demiris made to each of his brothers (Exhibits 2 and 3)
of a portion of the interest in the note and mortgage show
clearly that Jim Demiris knew how to make a conveyance
of an interest in this chose of action, and further indicates
that he did not intend to do so as to Mrs. Demiris.
The cross-appellant sets forth three theories upon which
she relies~· The case of Boyle v. Dinsdale relied on for theory
( 1) is not applicable because in that case a deposit in a bank
account was made· payable to either one or two persons under
such circumstances as to indicate a completed gift in trust
to the payees. Columbia Trust Company v. Anglum, relied on
in theory ( 2) , again is not in point, for this was another
deposit in a bank account, where both parties owned and
contributed money, and ti?.e court found a joint tenancy. The
statement _under this theory that Mr. Demiris said he wanted
.his wife to have the money if he got sick is a misrepresentation
of the evidence. What Mr. Demiris said, according to Mr .
.Long, was: "He said he would like her to be able to cash the
check in case he was sick or somehing she could cash it and
have some money" (R. 323). Theory (3) is that this letter of
:instruction constituted an assignment, relying on the case of
Thatcher v. Merriam, 121 Utah 191, 240 P 2d. 266. This
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Merriam case does not in any way support the counterclaim,
for the language in the assignment there was very clear and
specific. (See page 268) .

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
trial court in awarding to the executor Trust Account No.
0-6635 with American Savings and Loan Association, and
dismissing the defendant's counterclaim for the interest of
, James Demiris in the Elmer Butler note and mortgage, should
be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
DAVID K. WATKISS
721 Cont'l Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
NATHAN J. FULLMER
619 Cont'l Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
D. F. WILKINS
305 Newhouse Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

Atto1'neys fo1' Appellants
and C1'oss;.Respondents
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